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Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association Report 
MAJOR INVESTOR LOSSES DUE TO CONFLICTED ADVICE: 
BROKERAGE INDUSTRY ADVERTISING CREATES THE 
ILLUSION OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Misleading Ads Fuel Confusion,  
Underscore Need for Fiduciary Standard 
 
Joseph C. Peiffer and Christine Lazaro 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
No national standard exists today requiring brokerage firms to put their 
clients’ interests first by avoiding making profits from conflicted advice. In the 
five years since the passage of the Dodd Frank Act, inaction by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) on a fiduciary standard has cost American 
investors nearly $80 billion, based on estimated losses of $17 billion per year. 
Amid encouraging recent signs of possible action from the Department of 
Labor and the SEC, there is a compelling case to be made for a ban on 
conflicted advice in order to protect investors.  In the absence of such a 
standard, brokerage firms now engage in advertising that is clearly calculated 
to leave the false impression with investors that stockbrokers take the same 
fiduciary care as a doctor or a lawyer. But, while brokerage firms advertise as 
though they are trusted guardians of their clients’ best interests, they arbitrate 
any resulting disputes as though they are used car salesmen. 
A review by the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA) of 
the advertising and arbitration stances of nine major brokerage firms – Merrill 
Lynch, Fidelity Investments, Ameriprise, Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, 
Allstate Financial, UBS, Berthel Fisher, and Charles Schwab – finds that all 
nine advertise in a fashion that is designed to lull investors into the belief that 
they are being offered the services of a fiduciary. 
For example, Merrill Lynch advertises as follows: “It’s time for a financial 
strategy that puts your needs and priorities front and center.” Fidelity 
Investments appeals to investors with these words: “Acting in good faith and 
taking pride in getting things just right. The personal commitment each of us 
makes to go the extra mile for our customers and put their interests before our 
own is a big part of what has always made Fidelity a special place to work and 
do business.” 
Nonetheless, all nine brokerage firms using the fiduciary-like appeals in 
their ads eschew any such responsibility when it comes to battling investor 
claims in arbitration. Adding to the confusion is the fact that five of the eight 
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brokerage firms – Ameriprise, Merrill Lynch, Fidelity, Wells Fargo, and 
Charles Schwab – have publicly stated that they support a fiduciary standard. 
But these firms are every bit as vociferous as the other four brokerages in 
denying that they have any fiduciary obligation when push comes to shove in 
an arbitration case filed by investors who have lost some or all of their nest 
egg due to conflicted advice. 
In this atmosphere of misleading advertising and a complete disavowal by 
brokerage firms of the same ad claims in arbitration, investor losses will 
continue to mount at the rate of nearly $20 billion per year until the SEC and 
DOL prescribe the long-overdue remedy: a “fiduciary duty” standard banning 
conflicted advice.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Currently, there is no national standard requiring brokerage firms to put 
investors’ interest in preserving their nest eggs over brokerage firms’ interest 
in making money from those investors’ accounts. According to a recent study, 
every year that goes by without a rule that requires brokers to put investors’ 
interests first costs American investors another $17 billion.1 Dodd- Frank, 
passed five years ago, mandated that the Securities & Exchange Commission 
(the “SEC”) study this issue. During the course of the last five years without a 
SEC rule, inaction on the issue has cost investors nearly $80 billion.2 
The problem continues to grow worse as more and more Americans lose 
their defined benefit plans and, instead, roll their life savings into IRAs,3 which 
they must invest for their future. A critical component of the problem is the 
brokerage industry’s marketing efforts to convince investors they absolutely 
require the assistance of brokers to protect their retirement savings. The Public 
                                                            
1. See “The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings,” 
February 2015, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_ 
coi_report _final.pdf. 
2.  See id. $17 billion times 4.6 years since the passage of Dodd-Frank equals $79.22 
billion. 
3. Beginning in the 1970s and continuing through the end of 2013, the number of 
Americans covered by a traditional pension plan was cut in half while the number of 
Americans depending on 401(k)s and IRAs more than doubled. See “The Effects of 
Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings,” February 2015, p.5 available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf. 
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Investors Arbitration Bar Association (“PIABA”)4 has a conducted a study to 
determine whether brokerage firms advertise like they have a duty to put 
investors interests first, but when called to account for their actions, litigate 
like they have no such duty. 
The results are striking. Firms routinely advertise themselves as giving 
personalized, ongoing, non-conflicted advice that puts the customer first. 
Brokerage firms have also taken the position publicly with the regulators that 
such a duty should exist. But, when called to account for their actions, these 
same brokerage firms litigate like they have no such duty. This highlights the 
need for a national, strong fiduciary duty that holds firms to the standard they 
advertise to the public and articulate to the regulators. 
The lack of a national fiduciary standard is not just an abstract 
philosophical question. The lack of such a standard has real-world implications 
for investors, like Ethel Sprouse. Ms. Sprouse is a baby boomer from Cedar 
Bluff, Alabama. Her husband suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. Her adult 
daughter is mentally disabled and lives in a group home. Ms. Sprouse and her 
husband are unsophisticated investors and, like most, entrusted their retirement 
savings to a trusted financial adviser, who in the Sprouses’ case was a 
registered representative of Allstate Financial (“Allstate”). As her husband’s 
mental capacity and daughter’s health diminished, the financial strain on the 
family increased and Ms. Sprouse’s reliance on Allstate to provide her with 
sound financial advice grew even more crucial. In 2007, the Sprouses 
transferred all of their life savings to Allstate so that it could be managed by 
one trusted firm. In short, Allstate used the trust placed in them and invested 
virtually all of the Sprouses’ nest egg into a non-diversified portfolio of stocks, 
which objectively is very risky and unsuitable for most investors. As a result, 
Mr. and Mrs. Sprouse lost approximately $400,000 and the Sprouses sued 
Allstate in arbitration5 to recover their losses. The arbitration case is currently 
pending. 
                                                            
4.  PIABA is a national, not-for-profit bar association comprised of more than 450 
attorneys, including law school professors and former regulators, who devote a 
significant portion of their practice to the representation of public investors in 
securities arbitration. 
5. Allstate included a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause in its brokerage 
agreement with Mr. and Mrs. Sprouse. As result, the Sprouses are unable to seek the 
help of a court or a jury of their peers, but rather, had no choice other than to file an 
arbitration administrated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (which is 
owned by the very brokerage firms customers such as the Sprouses sue) to seek a 
recovery of their losses. 
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For decades, Allstate’s marketing success has been based on the principle 
that they put their clients’ interest first. The “You’re In Good Hands” slogan 
is one of the most prolific in U.S. history. Indeed, while the Sprouses’ 
retirement savings were invested with Allstate, every monthly account 
statement contained the “Good Hands” recognizable symbol and phrase of 
trust. However, as illustrated below, when sued, Allstate’s legal position is it 
owed no fiduciary duty to the Sprouses. This report will first review the current 
landscape of the differing standards of duty that apply to brokerage firms and 
investment advisors and the SEC and Department of Labor’s (DOL) efforts to 
harmonize those duties. The report then discusses a number of firms’ public 
positions and advertisements regarding their commitment to act in investors’ 
best interest contrasted with their litigation strategy of denying that any such 
duty exists. The report concludes that the SEC and DOL should hold brokerage 
firms to their public statements and remove all doubt that brokerage firms must 
put investors’ interest first. 
 
 
The Current Landscape: Investment Adviser and Broker Duties 
 
Investment advice is provided to investors by two different types of 
financial advisors: 
Investment Advisers and Brokers. Each is subject to different regulatory 
regimes, although there is some overlap in those who enforce the regulations. 
Investment Advisers are subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the 
“Advisers Act”) and the rules promulgated thereunder as well as state statutes 
and regulations. The SEC and the state securities regulators enforce those 
statutes and regulations. Brokers are governed by the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and the rules promulgated thereunder as well as 
by state statutes and regulations. In addition, Brokers are regulated by the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), a self-regulatory 
organization and are subject to the rules promulgated by FINRA.6  
Investment Advisers must adhere to a fiduciary duty standard, which is 
derived from judicial interpretations of the Advisers Act. The fiduciary duty is 
generally defined by case law to include the duty of loyalty and care, and the 
obligation to always put the client’s interests before and above the Investment 
Advisor’s own interests when the Advisor interacts with a client. Brokers, 
instead of a fiduciary standard, must adhere to a suitability standard which is 
                                                            
6.  Both brokers and investment advisers are subject to the various states’ common 
law regarding the imposition of fiduciary duty. The patchwork of inconsistent state 
laws on the subject only serves to highlight the critical need for a national standard. 
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premised on a FINRA rule that requires a Broker to have a reasonable basis 
for believing a recommendation of a security or an investment strategy is 
“suitable” for a client, based on the client’s investment profile. 
Although both Investment Advisers and Brokers are regulated extensively, 
the differences in these regulatory regimes lead to different results for 
investors. Investors generally are not aware of these differences or their legal 
implications. Many investors are also confused by the different standards of 
care that apply to Investment Advisers and Brokers, and many do not even 
know with which type of investment professional with whom they are doing 
business. Investors believe their financial advisor, be the title “broker” or 
“investment adviser,” is acting in their best interest. That confusion has been 
a source of concern for regulators and Congress. Section 913 of Title IX of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the 
“Dodd-Frank Act”) required the SEC to conduct a study to evaluate: 
 The effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of care 
(imposed by the Commission, a national securities association, and other 
federal or state authorities) for providing personalized investment advice 
and recommendations about securities to retail customers; and 
 Whether there are legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in 
legal or regulatory standards in the protection of retail customers relating 
to the standards of care for providing personalized investment advice 
about securities to retail customers that should be addressed by rule or 
statute.7 
 
 
Proposed Changes 
 
In January 2011, the Staff of the SEC issued its report to Congress 
following the study it conducted pursuant to section 913 of Dodd-Frank. The 
Staff made the following recommendation: 
The Commission should engage in rulemaking to implement the 
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers when providing personalized investment advice 
about securities to retail customers. Specifically, the Staff 
recommends that the uniform fiduciary standard of conduct 
established by the Commission should provide that: 
                                                            
7. See “Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers,” Executive Summary, p. i, 
January 2011, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.  
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the standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and investment 
advisers, when providing personalized investment advice about 
securities to retail customers (and such other customers as the 
Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act in the best interests 
of the customer without regard to the financial or other interests of the 
broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.8 
The Staff interpreted this uniform fiduciary standard to encompass the 
duties of loyalty and care as interpreted and developed under the Advisers Act 
Sections 206(1) and 206(2).9  
Between 2011 and 2013, the SEC did not issue any rules in furtherance of 
the Staff’s recommendations. Instead, in March 2013, two years after the staff 
recommendation, the SEC sought further data and other information, noting it 
had not yet decided whether to commence rulemaking.10 
 
 
SEC Commissioner Perspectives 
 
PIABA believes that the SEC should commence rule-making 
immediately, clarifying the existence and extent of the fiduciary duty and 
thereby holding brokerage firms to the standards of conduct they advertise to 
the public. Commissioners White and Aguilar have both expressed support for 
rulemaking that would stop brokerage firms from marketing like they have a 
duty to put investors first and litigating like no such duty exists.11 
                                                            
8.  See “Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers,” pp. 109–10, January 
2011, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. 
9.  See id. at p. 111. 
10. See “Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers,” SEC Release No. 
34069013, p. 9, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2013/34-69013.pdf. 
11. Chairman White has recently expressed her view on the subject. She recently stated 
that the SEC should “implement a uniform fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers where the standard is to act in the best interest of the investor.” 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/sec-will-develop-fiduciary-
duty-rule-forbrokers-white-says 
Commissioner Aguilar has been strongly in support of adoption of a fiduciary duty for 
Brokers: “I am issuing this statement to be clear as to my position — it is in the best 
interests of investors and our markets for broker-dealers who provide investment 
advice to be held to the fiduciary standard that is currently applied to investment 
advisers.” Statement by SEC Commissioner: Statement in Support of Extending a 
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Commissioner Stein has not clearly articulated her stance on a uniform 
fiduciary rule, but has expressed support for aligning the interests of brokers 
and investors, which underlies a part of a uniform fiduciary rule.12 
Commissioners Gallagher and Piwowar have both stated that they believe 
more study is necessary.13 
 
 
The Department of Labor Action 
 
The Department of Labor has examined the role Brokers and Investment 
Advisers play in the management of retirement accounts. In 2010, the DOL 
proposed a rule under ERISA broadly defining the circumstances under which 
a person is considered to be a ‘‘fiduciary’’ by reason of giving investment 
                                                            
Fiduciary Duty to Broker-Dealers who Provide Investment Advice, May 11, 2010, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch051110 laa.htm. 
12. Commissioner Stein explained her position as follows: 
No doubt, disclosure remains the heart of our investor protection regime. But 
we also know from experience that sometimes it isn’t enough – or to put it 
another way, that it works better under some conditions than others. What are 
the conditions under which it works best? Basically, where we have done 
everything we can to align those interests that should naturally be aligned. 
When interests are aligned, there are fewer incentives to play games, and 
better results for ordinary investors, who can make straight-forward, smart 
decisions… On the market participant side, we have professional standards 
and rules to ensure that investment advisers’ and broker-dealers’ interests are 
appropriately aligned – or at least, not misaligned – with the investors they 
serve… Are our rules in all of these areas perfect? No. Is there a lot to be 
done and improved? Absolutely. For example, the Commission is in the midst 
of considering how to better align the interests of broker-dealers with the 
investors they serve. It’s an important area, and I’m looking forward to seeing 
progress made. 
Remarks Before the Consumer Federation of America’s 27th Annual Financial 
Services Conference, December 4, 2014, available at http://www.sec.gov/News/ 
Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543593434#.VO5nGfnF8Yk. 
13. See Remarks at the 2014 SRO Outreach Conference, September 16, 2014, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542969623#.VO 
5lkPnF8Yk; Remarks at the National Association of Plan Advisors D.C. Fly-In Forum, 
September 30, 2014, available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/ 
1370543077131#.VO5pJfnF8Yk. 
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advice to an employee benefit plan or a plan’s participants.14 The DOL 
encountered fierce industry opposition from the very brokerage firms that 
advertise their personalized service, received extensive comments on the rule 
proposal, and withdrew the proposal in order to conduct further analysis.15 
The DOL is in the process of reintroducing the rule proposal to require 
that those providing retirement investment advice act in the best interest of 
investors.16 The DOL cited to a study by the White House Council of 
Economic Advisers to explain the harms faced by investors as a result of 
conflicted investment advice: 
Based on extensive review of independent research, the White House 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) has concluded that conflicted 
advice causes affected savers to earn returns that are roughly 1 
percentage point lower each year (for example, a 5 percent return 
absent conflicts would become a 6 percent return). As a result, a retiree 
who receives conflicted advice when rolling over a 401(k) balance to 
an IRA at retirement will lose an estimated 12 percent of the value of 
his or her savings if drawn down over 30 years. If a retiree receiving 
conflicted advice takes withdrawals at the rate possible absent 
conflicted advice, his or her savings would run out more than 5 years 
earlier. Since conflicted advice affects an estimated $1.7 trillion of 
IRA assets, the aggregate annual cost of conflicted advice is about $17 
billion each year.17 
The DOL has submitted the rule proposal to the OMB’s Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) for a standard interagency 
review, after which it will publish a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” 
(“NPRM”). 
 
 
                                                            
14. See “Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary”,” 29 CFR Part 2510, available at 
http://webapps.dol.gov/Federal Register/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=24328. 
15.  See Department of Labor, “FAQs: Conflicts of Interest Rulemaking,” available at 
http://www.dol.gov/featured/ ProtectYourSavings/faqs.htm. 
16.  See Department of Labor, “FAQs: Conflicts of Interest Rulemaking,” available at 
http://www.dol.gov/featured/ ProtectYourSavings/faqs.htm. 
17.  See Department of Labor, “FAQs: Conflicts of Interest Rulemaking,” available at 
http://www.dol.gov/featured /ProtectYourSavings/faqs.htm. See also “The Effects of 
Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings,” February 2015, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf. 
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Brokerage Firms Advertise Like They Offer Ongoing 
Personalized Service That Puts the Investor First, But Deny Any 
Such Duty When Called To Account For Their Actions 
 
There is a striking difference between the positions brokerage firms take 
when soliciting customers and those they take when those customers arbitrate 
claims against the same firms.  Set forth below are various firms’ 
proclamations to the public set forth in advertisements contrasted with those 
firms’ arguments set forth to FINRA arbitrators. On one hand, the firms boast 
that they offer unconflicted, trustworthy advice while, on the other hand, those 
same firms argue they are little more than salesmen with a single duty: to 
execute trades in customers’ accounts. 
 
________________________ 
 
ALLSTATE 
 
Allstate Tells The Public That Investors are “In Good Hands.” 
 
  
The Allstate slogan “You’re in good hands” was created a half century ago 
by Allstate Insurance Company’s sales executive David Ellis to demonstrate 
Allstate’s ongoing commitment to customers. The phrase came to him as the 
result of a reassuring remark made to his wife during the Spring of 1950 about 
their ailing child. She told him, “The hospital said not to worry. We’re in good 
hands with the doctor.” A study announced in September 2000 by 
Northwestern University’s Medill Graduate Department of Integrated 
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Marketing Communications found that the Allstate slogan “You’re in good 
hands” ranked as the most recognizable in America.18  
Ethel Sprouse trusted Allstate and its financial adviser. She believed that 
they were required to put her interests first. Indeed, while Allstate managed 
the Sprouses’ retirement savings, every monthly account statement contained 
the above illustrated recognizable symbol and phrase of trust. 
 
 
Allstate Tells Arbitrators That Good  
Hands Owe No Fiduciary Duty 
 
Notwithstanding Allstate’s famous slogan, when Ms. Sprouse sued 
Allstate in FINRA arbitration after her trusted Allstate financial advisor 
breached their trust relationship and lost approximately $400,000 of the 
Sprouses’ life savings, Allstate raised the defense that “Állstate Financial 
Services owed no fiduciary duty to Claimants, and, therefore, no such duty 
was breached.”19 
 
________________________ 
 
UBS 
 
UBS Tells The Public That the Client Comes First 
 
“Until my client knows she comes first. Until I understand what drives her. 
And what slows her down. Until I know what makes her leap out of bed in the 
morning. And what keeps her awake at night. Until she understands that I’m 
always thinking about her investment. (Even if she isn’t.) Not at the office. But 
at the opera. At a barbecue. In a traffic jam. Until her ambitions feel like my 
ambitions. Until then. We will not rest. UBS.” (Emphasis in advertisement.)20 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
18. See http://www.adslogans.co.uk/site/pages/gallery/youre-in-good-hands-with-all 
state.8355.php. 
19. See Ex. 1. Also included in the exhibit is a copy of the Sprouses’ Statement of 
Claim that served as the basis for the Answer. 
20.  See Ex. 2. 
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UBS Tells Regulators That The Client Does Not Come First 
 
UBS, like many other firms, ignores the representations in its advertising 
when it is forced to defend its actions. “[A] broker does not owe a fiduciary 
duty to his customer in a nondiscretionary account.”21 
 
________________________ 
 
 
Morgan Stanley Tells The Public That  
It Provides a Personalized Plan 
 
“Having an intimate knowledge of blue chips and small caps is important. 
But even more important is an intimate knowledge of you and your goals. Get 
connected to a Morgan Stanley Financial Advisor and get a more personalized 
plan for achieving success.”22 Morgan Stanley Tells Arbitrators That Its 
Personalized Plans Can Put The Firm’s Interests Ahead of Clients’ Despite 
representing that personalized plans would be used, Morgan Stanley says it 
will only have a fiduciary duty when the service goes beyond the plan and 
includes Morgan Stanley taking over the trading in an account on a 
discretionary basis. “There is no fiduciary duty where, as here, the client 
maintains a non-discretionary brokerage account.”23 
“Claimants claim of breach of fiduciary duty fails as a matter of law and 
should be dismissed in its entirety. Claimant’s claim seeks to impose 
‘fiduciary’ obligations and duties on Respondents that only arise in very 
limited circumstances that do not exist here, i.e. where Respondents are given 
discretionary trading authority over Claimant’s accounts.”24 
 
________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
21.  See Ex. 3. 
22.  See Ex. 4. 
23.  See Ex. 5. 
24.  See Ex. 6. 
12 FIDUCIARY DUTY REPORT [Vol. 22 No. 1 
BERTHEL FISHER 
 
Berthel Fisher Tells The Public That It Maintains the  
“Highest Standard of Integrity.” 
 
“We are committed to maintaining the highest standards of integrity and 
professionalism in our relationship with you, our client. We endeavor to know 
and understand your financial situation and provide you with only the highest 
quality information and services to help you reach your goals.”25 
 
 
Berthel Fisher Tells Arbitrators That the “Highest Standard of 
Integrity” Does Not Include a Duty to Put Investors First 
 
While “highest standard of integrity” certainly sounds like a representation 
that a clients’ interests will be put first, Berthel Fisher says it does not owe a 
fiduciary duty to clients. “Respondents deny that they owed fiduciary duties to 
Claimants.”26 
 
________________________ 
 
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL 
 
Ameriprise Financial Tells The Public That Its Advisors are 
Ethically Obligated To Act With Your Best Interests At Heart.” 
 
“Focus on your dreams and goals 
“Once you’ve identified your dreams and goals, and you and the advisor 
have decided to work together, you can count on sound recommendations that 
address your goals. You’ll be able to clearly see and discuss how the actions 
and decisions you make today will affect your tomorrow. You can expect to 
hear about the options you have and any underlying factors to consider. Our 
advisors are ethically obligated to act with your best interests at heart.”27 
                                                            
25. See http://www.kevinyaley.com/!CustomPage.cfm?PageID=1&disclaimer=acc 
ept. 
26.  See Ex. 7. 
27.  From the Ameriprise Financial website, Our Advisors, “What to expect from an 
Ameriprise financial advisor,” http://www.ameriprise.com/financial-planning/ 
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“Personalized advice and recommendations on an ongoing basis 
“Perhaps the best thing about working with a personal financial advisor is 
that your financial plan is custom made for you. The financial advisor you 
choose to work with knows all about you. When and if you experience a life 
change, your priorities shift or you have a pressing financial question, you can 
contact your advisor for information and financial advice that’s meaningful to 
you. You may meet a few times during a year and have several discussions. 
Your advisor will make every effort to be available to you when needed.”28 
 
 
Ameriprise Financial Tells Regulators That It  
Advocates For A Uniform Fiduciary Duty 
 
Ameriprise has publicly told the SEC that it supports the imposition of a 
fiduciary duty on brokers, such as Ameriprise. “Our business has been built on 
a financial planning model with personalized investment advisory services at 
its core. Our experience in offering retail advice under the Advisers Act, with 
its enhanced disclosure requirements and other investor protections, has led us 
to advocate for a uniform fiduciary standard throughout the recent legislative 
process and endorse SIFMA’s support of a uniform fiduciary standard of 
conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers providing personalized 
advice about securities to retail clients.”29 
 
 
Ameriprise Financial Tells Arbitrators That It  
Doesn’t Believe this Duty Exists 
 
Despite is advertising campaign promising to put client interests first and 
even publicly supporting and acknowledging a belief that a fiduciary duty is 
required, Ameriprise has nevertheless argued in arbitration it owes no such 
                                                            
ameriprise-financialadvisors/financial-advisor-expectations.asp, last visited February 
25, 2015. 
28. From the Ameriprise Financial website, Our Advisors, “What to expect from an 
Ameriprise financial advisor,” http://www.ameriprise.com/financial-planning/ 
ameriprise-financialadvisors/financial-advisor-expectations.asp, last visited February 
25, 2015. 
29.  Ameriprise Financial, Inc. Letter to the SEC dated August 30, 2010, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/ 4-606/4606-2640.pdf. 
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duty. “Respondent owed no fiduciary duties to Claimants and, even if it did, 
no such duties were breached.”30
 
________________________ 
 
MERRILL LYNCH 
 
Merrill Lynch Tells The Public That It  
Puts Investors “Needs Front and Center” 
 
“It’s time for a financial strategy that puts your needs and priorities front 
and center. 
“Adapting the approach as life changes and goals are reached. As goals 
and priorities change, so should your approach.”32
“Our organization has all the tools and technology and ease of use that you 
would want. But ultimately, the real measure is when you sit down with your 
advisor and build that trusting relationship… and at any time you know exactly 
where you stand… when you think about progress towards what it is you want 
to accomplish with your… finances and with your money.  
“Our entire company’s purpose is to help you achieve the best life for 
yourself, and for your family. And this purpose, to making life better extends 
even further to our communities and beyond. We’re proud of our company. 
We want you to be proud of it as well, and for you to value your relationship 
with us.”33 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
30. See Ex. 8. 
31. [sic] Footnote omitted from original report. 
32. From the Merrill Lynch website, Working with Us, “From a Conversation to a 
Relationship,” https://www.ml.com/life-goals.html, last visited February 25, 2015. 
33. From the Merrill Lynch website, Working with Us, “From a Conversation to a 
Relationship,” John Thiel, the head of Merrill Lynch Wealth Management, on what 
makes working with Merrill Lynch so different, https://mlaem.fs.ml.com/content/ 
dam/ML/working-with-us/pdfs/transcriptlife-goals-thiel.pdf, last visited February 25, 
2015. 
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Merrill Lynch34 Tells Regulators That It  
Supports A Uniform Fiduciary Duty 
 
“Bank of America supports applying a new, harmonized standard of care 
to all financial professionals providing personalized investment advice to 
individual investors. In particular, we believe that both broker-dealers and 
investment advisers giving personalized investment advice to individual 
investors should be subject to a fiduciary duty that is clearly prescribed. We 
further believe that any new fiduciary standard of care should be applied in a 
manner that both enhances investor protection and preserves the availability 
of choices for clients. Informed client choice is critical to ensuring that 
investment objectives are attained.35
 
 
Merrill Lynch Tells Arbitrators That It Has No  
Duty to Put Investors “Front and Center” 
 
Despites marketing that clients’ interest would be “front and center” and a 
desire to “build a trusting relationship” as well as publicly supporting the 
imposition of a fiduciary duty, Merrill Lynch has refused to acknowledge it 
owes a fiduciary duty in arbitration when it breaches that duty to investors. 
“The Second Circuit ruled that in a non-discretionary securities account, there 
is no ongoing duty of reasonable care that requires a brokerage firm to give 
advice or monitor information beyond the limited transaction-by-transaction 
duties that are implicated in executing its customer’s instructions.”36
“Respondents did not stand in a fiduciary relationship with Claimants.”37
 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
34. Bank of America purchased Merrill Lynch in the fall of 2008 and Merrill Lynch is 
therefore now a division of Bank of America Corp. 
35. Bank of America Corp. Letter to the SEC dated August 30, 2010, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2583.pdf. 
36. See Ex. 9. 
37. See id. 
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FIDELITY INVESTMENTS 
 
Fidelity Investments Tells The Public That It  
Puts Investors’ “Interests Before Our Own” 
 
“Acting in good faith and taking pride in getting things just right. The 
personal commitment each of us makes to go the extra mile for our customers 
and put their interests before our own is a big part of what has always made 
Fidelity a special place to work and do business. With millions relying on us 
for their savings or the growth of their business, we handle every action and 
decision with integrity and personal attention to detail. Getting things just right 
doesn’t mean we’re perfect, but rather setting high standards, refusing to cut 
corners, and believing that every product, every experience, and every 
outcome can always be better.”38
 
 
Fidelity Investments Tells Regulators That It  
Supports A Uniform Fiduciary Duty 
 
“Fidelity supports a uniform fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers that would require broker-dealers and investment advisers 
to act in the best interest of retail customers when offering personalized 
investment advice about securities to such retail customers.”39
 
 
Fidelity Tells Arbitrators That It Denies Any Duty To  
Put Investors’ Interests Before Their Own 
 
Even though Fidelity Investments markets that it will put investors’ 
interests before its own and has publicly supported a fiduciary standard for 
brokerage firms, Fidelity has argued no such duty exists when defending itself 
in arbitrations with customers. “Claimants first claim fails because Fidelity did 
not owe [the investors] any fiduciary duty.”40
                                                            
38. From the Fidelity Investments website, About Fidelity, “Our Purpose and 
Standards,” https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/our-purpose-standards, last 
visited February 25, 2015. 
39. Fidelity Investments Letter to the SEC dated July 5, 2013, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-3117.pdf. 
40. See Ex. 10. 
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________________________ 
 
WELLS FARGO 
 
Wells Fargo Tells The Public That Investors  
“Feel that Your Best Interests are the Top Priority” 
 
“Are we working toward common goals? A healthy relationship with 
your Financial Advisor should make you feel that your best interests are the 
top priority, no matter what is happening in the market and no matter the size 
of your portfolio. Furthermore, you should like your advisor, and both you and 
your advisor should feel that all concerns are heard and addressed.”41 
“Are we sharing information and asking questions? Your financial 
consultant should provide you with the relevant information needed to help 
you feel informed about financial events that pertain to your investments. Your 
Financial Advisor may also answer any questions you might have about your 
monthly statements. Stay in contact to ensure that your advisor is current on 
your objectives and can make changes when necessary.”42
 
 
Wells Fargo Tells Regulators That It  
Supports A Uniform Fiduciary Duty 
 
“Wells Fargo fully supports the adoption of a uniform federal fiduciary 
duty standard for broker dealers when providing personalized investment 
advice regarding securities to retail clients. Properly implemented, such a 
standard will enhance protections for clients, preserve the opportunities for 
clients to select the level of service and type of relationship they desire, allow 
clients of all levels of sophistication and resources to be fully served and foster 
competition in the industry.”43
 
 
 
                                                            
41. From the Wells Fargo Advisors website, Working With a Financial Advisor, “How 
to Evaluate a Financial Advisor,” https://www.wellsfargoadvisors.com/financial-
advisor/articles/evaluatefinancial-advisor.htm, last visited February 25, 2015. 
42. See id. 
43. Wells Fargo & Co. Letter to the SEC dated August 30, 2010, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2592.pdf. 
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Wells Fargo Tells Arbitrators To Forget About Feelings,  
The Firm Is Not Required to Consider Investors’ Interest First 
 
Ignoring that it markets itself as making investors feel their “best interests 
are the top priority” and that Wells Fargo has even publicly supported the need 
for a uniform fiduciary duty, in private arbitrations, Wells Fargo has refused 
to acknowledge owing a fiduciary duty. “The law establishes that a broker does 
not owe a fiduciary duty to a customer with respect to a nondiscretionary 
account.”44 
 
________________________ 
 
CHARLES SCHWAB 
 
Charles Schwab Tells The Public That Its Brokers Are Proactive 
 
“For many years, we’ve encouraged investors like you to “Talk to Chuck” 
so we could help you manage through the array of investing challenges and 
opportunities. I still encourage you to do that. We’ll share with you our passion 
for investing and our thoughts on how to do it well, and we’ll listen to you to 
understand how we can help you reach your goals. But going forward, you’ll 
be hearing more about the values we stand for and why they might matter to 
you. Our communications will emphasize the fundamental belief we share 
with you: a belief that through personal engagement and a relationship of 
mutual respect, your financial goals and a better tomorrow are within reach.”45          
“Does my broker discuss the risks in my investment portfolio? 
“All investors need to understand the various risks in their investment 
portfolio and their tolerance level for those risks. But, how much and how 
often do you discuss these risks with your broker? Is your broker proactive 
about communicating possible risks as things change in the markets, economy 
or in your personal situation?”46 
 
                                                            
44. See Ex. 11. 
45. From the Schwab website, Why Choose Schwab, “An Open Letter from Chuck,” 
http://www.schwab.com/public/file/P-6083252/Chuck_Open_Letter.pdf, last visited 
February 25, 2015. 
46. From the Schwab website, Own Your Tomorrow, “Stay Engaged Questions,” 
http://content.schwab.com/corporate/own-your-tomorrow/#Stay-Engaged-Questions, 
last visited February 25, 2015. 
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Charles Schwab Tells Regulators That The  
Customers’ Interests Should Come First 
 
“Given the narrow area of overlap, the Commission should consider a 
straight-forward rule, simply tracking the language of Dodd-Frank Section 
913(g)(1): 
“The standard of conduct” when providing non-discretionary 
“personalized investment advice about securities to a retail customer” 
for a commission or other transaction-based compensation is “to act 
in the best interest of the customer without regard to the financial or 
other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the 
advice.””47
 
 
Charles Schwab Tells Arbitrators That  
Customers’ Interests Do Not Come First. 
 
Even though Charles Schwab told regulators that personalized investment 
advice provided in exchange for a commission should require the broker to act 
in the best interest of a customer without regard to the broker’s own financial 
interest, it takes a very different approach when pleading its case to the 
arbitrators. “Where a customer maintains a non-discretionary account, a 
broker-dealer’s duties are quite limited. A broker does not, in the ordinary 
course of business, owe a fiduciary duty to a purchaser of securities.”50
 
 
Why Wouldn’t Investors Want A Uniform Fiduciary Rule? 
 
In the above advertisements, brokerage firms consistently acknowledge 
that investors want, expect and need for brokerage firms to put their interests 
first. However, when the reality of the imposition of a fiduciary duty is 
evaluated, broker firms have changed their story and often argued that such a 
                                                            
47. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. Letter to the SEC dated July 5, 2013, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-3137.pdf. 
48. [sic] Footnote omitted from original report. 
49. [sic] Footnote omitted from original report. 
50. Ex. 12. 
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duty would actually harm investors. If some representatives of the brokerage 
industry are to be believed, the imposition of a national fiduciary duty would 
result in higher costs for investors and a barrier to low-income investors’ 
access to brokerage advice. For example, the National Association of Plan 
Advisors (“NAPA”), a securities industry advocacy group, claims that a 
“conflict of interest” rule is really a “no advice” rule. In other words, according 
to NAPA, prohibiting conflicts of interests would “block Americans from 
working with the financial advisors and investment providers they trust simply 
because they offer different financial products – like annuities and mutual 
funds – with different fees.”51
 NAPA continues: “This rule could even restrict who can help you with 
your 401(k) rollover.” The situation would be particularly dire, according to a 
2011 study prepared by Oliver Wyman Inc. in response to the DOL’s first 
attempt to propose a uniform fiduciary standard.52
 According to the abstract of the report, IRAs are widely held by small 
investors, who overwhelmingly favor brokerage relationships over advisory 
ones, and the proposed rule would prohibit 7.2 million current IRAs from 
receiving investment advice thanks to account minimums.53
 Further, the study claims that costs for brokerage IRA customers would 
increase between 75% and 195%.54
Actual data, as opposed to the rhetoric and hyperbole, demonstrates that 
the imposition of a fiduciary duty upon brokers has no meaningful impact on 
cost to investors or access to investment advice.55
 In fact, differences in state broker-dealer common law standards of care 
have been tested to determine whether a relatively stricter fiduciary standard 
of care affects the ability to provide services to customers, and it was found 
that there is no statistical difference in the brokers’ ability to provide services 
                                                            
51. “White House Rule Could Block 401(k) Participants from Advice,” available at 
http://asppanews.org/2015/02/23/white-house-rule-could-block-401k-participants-
from-advice/ 
52. The report was submitted to DOL by Davis & Harman LLP on April 12, 2011, on 
behalf of twelve financial services firms that offer services to retail investors. The 
cover letter and report can be found at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/WymanStudy 
041211.pdf. 
53. See id. at p. 2. 
54. See id. 
55. Finke, Michael S. and Langdon, Thomas Patrick, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer 
Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice (March 9, 2012). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019090 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019090. 
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to higher or lower wealth clients, or their ability to provide a broad range of 
products including those that provide commissioned compensation. There was 
also no difference in the ability to provide tailored advice. And, perhaps most 
cuttingly for the industry’s argument – there was no difference in the cost of 
compliance.  
Given that the imposition of a uniform fiduciary rule neither affects access 
to investment advice nor increases costs, it is clear that the rule stands to 
benefit investors in a meaningful way by prohibiting conflicted investment 
advice. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Billions each year slip through the fingers of American investors because 
of the conflicted investment advice they receive. The SEC and DOL must take 
action to force brokerage firms to live up to the standard that they market to 
investors rather than the one brokerage firms argue when they have wronged 
those same investors. Brokerage firms advertise that they put customers’ 
interests first, offer personalized advice and do all of this on an ongoing basis. 
In other words, they advertise that they are a fiduciary such as a doctor or 
lawyer. But, when a dispute arises with investors, brokerage firms consistently 
argue they have the duties of a used car salesman. SEC and DOL action for a 
strong, national fiduciary standard is the only way to protect investors’ hard-
earned retirement savings by holding firms to the image they themselves 
present. 
